ABSTRACT The behavioral analysis of cyber-physical systems in safety-critical scenarios is a challenging task. In this paper, the endogenous and exogenous aspects of resilience are of cornerstone importance in system design and verification. Endogenous resilience is the inherent ability of the system to detect and process internal faults and malicious attacks. Exogenous resilience is the permanent capability of the system to maintain a safe operation within its ambient environment. In this paper, we present a predictive dual-sided contract-based formal methodology to address both aspects of resilience on top of a distributed object-oriented component-based software model. It is illustrated by a case study of urban drone rescue systems. We exploit the formalism of timed automata and the toolbox UPPAAL to predict by abstraction and analyze (simulate and verify) endogenous resilience. Instead of presenting the final models of the case study, we reflect our experience with UPPAAL in generic patterns of system design and contract specification, reusable in other contexts with adaptations. The analysis of exogenous resilience is specific to the considered drone rescue system. It consists of synthesizing by iterative model-checking safe flight paths for the drones within a 3D virtual model of urban surroundings true to modern cities.
be resilient: the ability to withstand a major disruption with respect to permissible degradation parameters and to recover within acceptable times and composite risks and costs [2] .
The resilience aspects of CPSs are well summarized in [3] . The authors highlight the robust control issues that require consideration of the following measures: 1) the adoption of model-based approaches in software design and verification; 2) the diagnostic of the endogenous resilience relying on the system ability to handle internal faults and malicious attacks; 3) the analysis of the exogenous resilience relying on the system ability to maintain a safe operation within its ambient environment by ensuring reliable control over sensors and actuators. Our work orbits around these topics.
Industrialists are still using common reactive componentbased approaches to design software for CPSs [4] [5] [6] . Under these approaches, software is rigid and hard to maintain. The operation of a subsystem in the CPS is a row of cyclic reactions to environment inputs. This mode of operation does not allow a safe interactive behavior between the system parts. Indeed, data are crudely sent and received ''asynchronously'' between subsystems through wired and/or wireless networks. This exchange has three major drawbacks: it is error-prone by naming and processing the crude data, does not elucidate the interaction scenarios between subsystems during design, and hardens their verification. The standards and norms [7] [8] [9] governing the design of safety-critical (aeronautic, railway, automotive, etc) CPSs recommend component-based development and formal methods for design and verification, while providing reliable solutions to the above issues at the risk of blaming the whole system integrity and certification [10] .
In this article, we adopt a distributed and object-oriented component-based approach (extended from [10] ) to design the software layer of a typical CPS: an urban drone rescue system with ground remote control. We define an objectoriented component as a software entity with the following functions: 1) it provides and requires environment-dependent synchronous service interfaces; 2) it exchanges directly crude data with its environment through asynchronous ports; 3) it might exhibit progressive behavior at the run-time [11] . By allowing distribution, the component instances can interact (synchronously or asynchronously) while being deployed in distant subsystem nodes. By allowing object-orientation, the safety-critical scenarios are easy to analyze since component interactions could be predicted early in design, and to trace and debug later in the implementation.
In order to analyze endogenous resilience in the considered CPS based on our software model, we establish a contractbased formal method to predict by abstraction and analyze the distributed interactive behavior of the system, the timing constraints of its networking activities, and its survivability in case of functional and timing faults, or detected malicious attacks during operation. We use the toolbox UPPAAL [12] to specify, simulate and verify endogenous resilience in our CPS case study. The formal language of UPPAAL, based on Timed Automata (TAs) networks [12] , [13] , is well-suited to meet our goals since it comes with various useful features for both design and verification: time-aware specifications, channel-based broadcasts and synchronization mechanisms, a C-like background language used to specify the behavioral effects of state transitions in TAs networks, graphical interfaces for behavior simulation and analysis of model-checking counterexamples, etc.
The main drawback we encountered by practicing modelchecking using UPPAAL is that fairness conditions, required to define starvation-free models and to ensure liveness, cannot be expressed neither in the Computation Tree Logic (CTL) [14] [15] [16] , used by UPPAAL to specify properties, nor in the model like in the TLA + language [17] . To overcome this problem, we consider a subset of CTL * [18] (combining CTL and the Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) [19] ) as an extension of CTL to express fairness conditions. Then, we show how they could be exploited to guarantee liveness properties, and how TAs can be constrained in UPPAAL to meet them.
Despite its wide academic recognition and successful use in some industrial applications (as summarized in [20] ), the common criticism against UPPAAL is about the current implementation of its model-checker based on hash tables [21] . It does not scale to large and complex applications due to the ''wall problem'' of combinatorial state explosion during verification. Therefore, to truly scale up, UPPAAL should be powered by efficient modelcheckers and complemented by incremental design on top approaches [22] . We sustain our contributions by UPPAAL mainly for the reasons mentioned above, and hope that more scalable inductive model-checkers based on efficient SAT/SMT solvers [23] , [24] with top-down componentbased abstraction languages and code generation tools will be made available around it in the future.
The analysis of exogenous resilience is specific to our case study of urban drone rescue systems. Concretely, it is relative to the ''safe presence'' of drones in their ambient environment and should be checked on sensor inputs (positions, battery level, etc) and actuator outputs (flight signals). Being in early predictive design, we synthesize optimized flight paths for the drones in a scaled 3D virtualization (built using Blender) true to the modern big cities. The synthesis of flight paths is done by iterative model-checking with respect to input safety properties (mainly obstacle avoidance).
The related works are provided and discussed in Section II. In Section III, we present our urban drone rescue system and its behavioral requirements. They are recalled in the next sections to illustrate gradually our contributions. In Section IV, we present our work methodology going from the operational design to resilience analysis. The software model of the considered system, and its underlying aspects of interoperability and data exchange are provided in Section V. A feasibility study of the implementation is provided in the same section. The complete formal analysis of the endogenous resilience in the system using UPPAAL is described in Section VI. A theoretical body about the expression of fairness conditions in timed automata under UPPAAL is also provided in the same section. In Section VII, we present the 3D-driven formal analysis of exogenous resilience using Blender. Section VIII is dedicated to the conclusion discussions and perspectives.
II. RELATED WORKS
Hollnagel et al. [25] and Hollnagel [26] change the regular process of safety analysis, focusing mainly on negative causes and impacts of unwanted events, and take into account the success stories that deem insignificant. With this aim, the authors promote a new safety analysis classification (Safety-I, Safety-II and Safety-III), and open up new perspectives on the consideration of resilience aspects.
Safety-I is the traditional definition used in safety norms: the system quality should ensure that the number of failure events harmful to workers, the public, or the environment is acceptably low. It requires avoidance of failures and mitigates their eventual consequences. Safety-II focuses on the system ability to succeed in its daily operation instead of studying incidents and failure events and mitigates their consequences as in Safety-I. It assumes that the daily performance variability provides the adaptations needed to respond to 33742 VOLUME 7, 2019 varying conditions, and hence is the reason that things go right [25] . Safety-III is likely the combination of the two previous ones. It acknowledges that acceptable and adverse outcomes have common basis, namely everyday performance adjustments. It offers a new ontological understanding of safety as a new field in system design and development, called ''Resilience Engineering''. Horizon openings could be cast on the current safety issues under this new concept: given that the world has become more complex, the explanations of unwanted outcomes or success stories of system performance can no longer be limited to cause-effect relations described by linear models [25] , [26] .
Of the extensive literature around CPSs, we discuss some topicality and works related to the ours. The European project CPSwarm aims to define approaches and tool chains to develop and test collaborative and reconfigurable autonomous CPSs (see www.cpswarm.eu). The project partners provide use cases about the usage of autonomous UAV systems in ambient environments, similar to our drone rescue system. Although, the case study was extracted from the CPSwarm workbench [27] and tailored with our interest to resilience.
Few academic works already exist around the study of CPS resilience because it is a recent research topic. In [28] , the proposed approach ensures resilience in CPSs through self-healing structural adaptation. This involves adding and removing components, or even changing their interaction at run-time. Zhu and Başar [29] propose a hybrid theoretical framework for robust and resilient control design. The proposed framework is applied to the design problem of voltage regulators in synchronous machines and motors.
In [30] , the authors distinguish between the notions of information and infrastructure dependability, and clearly illustrate the need to formally model and reason about the dependability aspects of CPS applications. Jovanov and Pajic [31] focus on the CPSs communication aspects and study the effects of intermittent data integrity guarantees on system performance under stealthy attacks. Cardenas et al. [32] also tackle the security issues in CPSs by identifying the problem of secure control, investigating the defenses that information security and control theory provide, and proposing a set of challenges that need to be addressed to improve the survivability of a CPS in case of cyberattacks. Vogel-Heuser et al. [33] propose a software architecture of an agent-based production CPS and consider interoperability and data consistency aspects in their model. They also provide an implementation of such system to evaluate multi-agent approach with regards to conventional production processes.
Perhaps the closest work to ours is the one in [34] since the authors make use of formal methods. They define a generic component-based CPS meta-model in UML, and show how it could be instantiated in concrete systems using a patternbased methodology based on the so called Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) approach [35] . They also apply a knowledgedriven process to determine all kind of relations between the ''cyber-'' and ''physical-'' components of different subsystems and their underlying functionalities to deal with their related resiliency and redundancy properties. Our predictive analysis of resilience in CPSs is specific compared to their approach. By cons, our software design model is scalable in concrete implementations as emphasized in Subsection V-D.
III. DRONE RESCUE SYSTEM
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones are quite useful for healthcare organizations especially in emergency situations to avoid traffic jams, or when traditional transports are severely restricted, following a natural disaster for example. Common applications include live broadcasts of accidents to early grasp them, and deliver the required medical supplies for wounded people. UAVs are safe enough to transport disease test samples and kits in areas with high contagion. In emergency medicine, the studies have shown that drones are fast to deliver automated external defibrillator to rescue out-of-hospital heart attack victims using geographic information systems. Flying at speeds of up to 97 km/h, the drone can reach patients within a radius of 13 km 2 per mn versus 10 mn average for traditional services which increases the chance of survival to 80% [36] . Being connected to livestream camera fixed on the drone, a Ground Control Station (GCS) instructs the first aid gestures for the patients, and provides the needed medical supply (transported as it happens by the drone). (1) a person on-site sends an alert to the GCS by smartphone; (2) GCS activates the drone; navigation phase: (3) the drone continuously sends navigation data to GCS; (4) GCS controls the drone when necessary; Exploration phase: (E) while hovering, (5) the drone broadcasts the accident scene to GCS, which in turn (6) may order it to provide medical supply for victims if needed. steps (3)/(4) and (5)/(6) are repeated with different frequencies (depicted by¨).
Nevertheless, the usage of UAVs remains very challenging at the design and verification levels despite the fast progress of their related technologies. Our work tackles these issues for the software layer of a Drone/GCS-based urban rescue system. We provide the system requirements to deal with the crash scenario of Fig. 1 . By receiving a notification from onsite persons who notice the crash severity (step 1), the GCS activates and sends immediately a drone to the place of the accident (step 2). Once flying, the drone sends continuously its navigation data (including its position composed of the VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. The diagram of our predictive methodology applied to analyze the endogenous and exogenous aspects of resilience in the considered drone rescue system; arrows significations: → uses or depends on, ⇒ tool input; inherits from.
latitude, longitude and altitude), the distance to the nearest obstacle, and the battery level (step 3). The GCS sends back control commands to the drone (when necessary) which may be either i) a next valid position to be reached from a set of possible paths, or ii) an emergency retrograde action if the drone is unable to continue the mission, because of a weak battery charge for example (step 4). When the destination is reached, the drone hovers around the accident location and broadcasts a live video stream of the situation (step 5), and continues to receive commands from the GCS to provide the appropriate medical supply, and assist the first aid gestures for the victims if required (step 6).
IV. PREDICTIVE METHODOLOGY
The graphic of Fig. 2 represents our predictive methodology used to address the endogenous and exogenous aspects of resilience in our drone rescue system. The first step of any system design is the identification of the subsystems involved, and the definition of their behavioral requirements. A large panel of languages (and tools) is available around the subject of requirement engineering (like System Modeling Language SysML [37] and Lifecycle Modeling Language LML [38] ). SysML has had a great success in the industry of safety-critical systems. The well-known use case and requirement diagrams of SysML are definitely useful to define high-level textual early specifications of systems. Given that the case study does not amount to significant complexity level, and only operational design is considered in this work, we do not exploit any of these languages to define system requirements; we settle for the informal description given in Section III.
Requirements are on the foundation of the design process, but are also used to define system contracts [39] , required for the verification phase. A contract is semantically a Hoare triplet [40] that annotates a system operation by assumptions on the inputs and guarantees on the outputs. We use for that the Block Contract Language (BCL) [41] to extract contracts from requirements. BCL is pattern-based and semi-formal, easy to read, and convert to formal statements. For better readability, the endogenous and exogenous BCL contracts are given in Subsection VI-E and Section VII along with the lowlevel properties used to verify our system design.
The software layer of our system is architected according to a Distributed Object-Oriented Component-Based Design (DOOCBD) approach extended from that of [10] . This new architecture embraces interface-driven composition, service-oriented interoperability, and direct data exchange between the behavioral jobs (tasks) of components. At run-time, these components are instantiated in distributed live objects that communicate (locally or remotely) while being deployed in connected software nodes embodied within the GCS and the drones (see Section V).
In order to bring in design the real conditions of operation, we need to analyze the system behavior within abstracted models of wireless network and middleware: the scenarios of exchanging (Tx/Rx) data through the network physical layer should be emulated with respect to a bounded latency. In addition, we should predict the system survivability when functional and timing faults or malicious attacks are detected.
The endogenous resilience involves the specification of all the critical scenarios and behavioral entities described above in TAs networks using UPPAAL. Endogenous BCL contracts are then translated to safety and liveness CTL properties and analyzed by the simulator and model-checker of the toolbox. Further details are provided in Section VI.
Concerning exogenous resilience, the design step involves 3D modeling of the urban environment and smooth animations of moving objects. The benefit of 3D models is stating the obvious: they schematize concepts more distinctly than any classic design language. Moreover, they allow an early feasibility of the system before realization. We use Blender with the built-in Contract Analysis Tool (CAT) to check if the exogenous BCL contracts, related to flight plannings and translated to LTL properties, are respected. If not, the flight path planning is corrected iteratively until the properties are met (see Section VII).
V. SOFTWARE MODEL
CPSs (and particularly the drone rescue system presented in Section III) are distributed and thoroughly compliant with the software component-based design presented in this section. It is an extended version of the DOOCBD approach already introduced in [10] . Before presenting the component architecture of the system, we start by introducing the principles of our approach, and its underlying properties of component interoperability and data exchange. executed periodically (resp continuously) by, call methods from, → data flow; x represent a sequence of elements x 1 , . . . , x n .
A. THE DOOCBD APPROACH
Distributed systems are networks of computing nodes interacting with (and controlling) physical processes. According to the model of Fig. 3 , a node is typically an open big object interacting with the physical environment and other nodes composing the system [10] . It accepts input data from (resp. provides services for) its environment, generates output data for (resp. requires services from) it, and may express progressive behaviors by running periodic jobs.
Crude (byte-coded) data can be exchanged directly with the physical environment and between nodes through source and well asynchronous ports (implemented resp. by methods o and w). These ports are especially suitable for low-level exchange with the hardware sensors and actuators used resp. to sense and control the physical processes. On the other hand, the services s are synchronous and used for highlevel inter-node interoperability. A service is a method with one-shot computation. It is callable locally by a node (private or public) or by its environment (only public), and may change the internal state (private attributes) of the node, and might require remote services from other distant nodes.
The jobs j handle the actions and reactions of the node while interacting with its environment. Like services, a job may have impact the internal state of the node. It may also 1) require (private or public) methods, or 2) act as a periodic crude data talker task (by running periodically data sources). Data listeners l are loops running continuously data wells in order to input aperiodic data flows. More details about talkers and listeners are presented in Subsection V-B.
The structure of components is almost the same as that of nodes but at finer levels of encapsulation and granularity. It is similar to the CORBA Component Model (CCM) [42] of OGM. Concretely, each node incorporates one or more partitions, each of which is a collection of component live instances. These instances may interact locally within their partitions, or with component instances of other partitions running on the same or distant nodes [10] .
B. SYN VS. ASYNCHRONOUS COMMUNICATIONS
The classic scheme of synchronous inter-node interoperability is depicted by the scenario of Fig. 4 . A node n requesting a service from a remote node m is blocked while waiting for it to return. The services m.srvc(r k n ) are handled by aperiodic tasks with priorities higher or lower than that of the nominal processes of m and should return before fixed time deadlines. These aperiodic executions of services may or not preempt the nominal process depending on their priorities and the processor architecture of the execution platform. Aperiodic We adopted for our approach a more constrained model of synchronous interoperability based on timeouts (see Fig.5 ) which guarantee a better timing predictability than the classic one: if it does not receive the return value of the service call within a fixed time window, the caller process rejects the call and takes the appropriate decision based on the criticality of the service, and its impact on the system integrity. Timeouts shall be adjusted to meet the task deadline.
Real-time analysis of the caller task should consider the worst-case blocking time of method calls (including network latency). Low latency can be ensured by using adequate networking models and hardware platforms to improve real-time determinism. High priority aperiodic service calls should not disturb the nominal processes of the invoked node. They should not be excessively delayed (so that the caller task meets the best possible deadlines) especially when they are critical for the caller process.
By adopting suitably method-based synchronous communication, the interoperability between objects is explicit in design, and the implementation is easy to debug and maintain. Nonetheless, the synchronous communication is not the best suited in other contexts, especially when the synchronization is non critical for the system's integrity, or when the data exchange is with low-level hardware components (sensors and actuators). When a byte-coded data D i is aperiodically received by the node m, it is handled by a server in order to convert it to a software consumable information. A server is a periodic-like task defined by two static parameters: a period and a time budget. Once active, it reads the pending (threaded in a buffer) received data as soon as possible within the limit of its budget. Data are handled in general according to their arrival instants. If the budget is exhausted, the server must wait until the next cycle of the server to resume reading data. In the scenario of Fig. 6 , we consider the example of a deferrable server [43] for asynchronous data acquisition.
The server may have higher or lower priority compared to that of nominal processes depending on the data importance.
Like for synchronous interactions, the implementation should ensure that important data processing is not excessively delayed, and does not disturb the real-time determinism of the nominal process.
Asynchronous communication has drawbacks: 1) it is rigid and difficult to maintain; 2) it is error-prone by wrongly reading data; 3) it may suffer from non-deterministic processing delays because data are buffered and handled according to reception order; 4) the underlying communication semantics between nodes is not explicit in the implementation.
C. COMPONENT-BASED ARCHITECTURE
The component architecture, depicted in Fig. 7 , presents the software structure of the drone rescue system, wherein nodes and partitions are not depicted. Given that it involves the use of several drones remotely guided by a GCS, its main components are highlighted: Drone and GCS. The middleware behavior is discussed in Subsection VI-B.
As briefly stated in Section III, Drone represents the main software unit of a connected drone. It is to perform the minimum of internal computations, and strictly follows the GCS commands, making it regularly aware of its state. All the heavy control operations, likely to consume an important amount of the drone energy (particularly the battery charge), are performed by GCS whose role is to fully control the drone mission remotely: paths computation, assistance decisions, retrograde actions, etc. It also controls the drone action on the crash site when filming the accident, and supplying the needed medical material.
Before starting the flight, the drone is activated by GCS by invoking the public (+) method Activate, provided remotely (@) from an instance of Drone running on the drone's embedded platform. Since it may simultaneously communicate with several drones, GCS maintains a map attribute paths (private -), associating each connected drone to a mission path, which is a cursor-moving array of records Coordinates, consisting of three fields: latitude, longitude and altitude. The flight path of each drone is initialized by GCS, and can be updated following unforeseen positions the drone may reach during its flight (Control). As soon as a position in the path is reached, the Drone instance updates (by the periodic job Flight) the next position by calling Fly_To from GCS.
In order to decide about the next position, GCS needs to be regularly informed of the drone's state (by invoking the method Get_Data). Drone periodically collects the following sensing data for GCS: 1) the current position (Coordinates) from the component Position_Updater (that acquires the latitude and the longitude from a GPS unit, and the altitude from a barometric sensor); 2) the distance to the nearest obstacle from the component Sonar (using an ultrasonic sensor); 3) the battery level from the component Battery_Checker; 4) a stability Boolean computed by Stability_Controller based on three-dimensional linear and angular acceleration parameters (resp. provided by an accelerometer and a gyroscope).
To reach the next position, Drone launches the speed control process by calling the method Actuate_Rotors (procedure) of the component Navigation_Controller. It computes the Speed_Request for the whole drone based on the individual Current_Speed of each rotor (provided by an instance of the component Rotor showed in Fig. 8 ) and its current Position. The actual speed is computed for each rotor using the actual number of revolutions from the last speed computation (determined from the pulses generated by the motor Encoder). This sensor has a predefined resolution in PPR (Pulses Per motor Revolution), and is asynchronously read by the instance of Rotor using the data listener Update_Pulses (server) through the data well Read_Pulses (see Fig. 6 ).
Once the speed request is computed, Navigation_Controller actuates each rotor using a Pulse-Width Modulation (PWM) command (Compute_Rotation_Command) passed to the method Rotate for each instance of Rotor interfaced with each motor (see Fig. 8 ). The actual PWM value is proportionally calibrated in relation to the error between the speed request and the current speed. Each Rotor then applies the PWM command through the data source PWM_Command.
When the destination is reached, GCS signals the drone to hover around the accident (by invoking the method Hover provided by Drone), to broadcast a live stream video of the accident using the data source Stream_Video, and to provide the appropriate medical supply (Which_Supply), if needed. When the mission ends, the drone flies back to the starting position based on the same principle of the outward flight, and is deactivated (Deactivate) by GCS upon arrival.
D. IMPLEMENTATION FEASIBILITY
Object-oriented development has often been a hard sell in safety-critical systems industry [44] . The applied standards require extensive verification processes and real-time difficult to carry on by the dynamic aspects and flexibility of object-oriented paradigms (polymorphism, dynamic dispatch, late binding, overriding, etc). The distribution is also penalizing because of its semantics (message passing, remote dispatch and procedure call, etc). The Ada programming language is sufficiently expressive to implement our software model and can decidedly deal with these disadvantages. It is strongly typed and object-oriented with a powerful and explicit support for tasking, concurrency, mutliprocessor architectures, compiler directives (pragmas), design by contracts [39] (the SPARK language [45] ), etc. It allows developers to exploit the object-oriented assets while avoiding vulnerabilities and ensuring real-time [10] , [44] . Besides, subsets of Ada are the target of many design and code generation toolboxes widely used in the industry (like SCADE Suite and Atelier B). VOLUME 7, 2019 A speed control application for connected wheeled robot platoons, 1 based on the DOOCBD approach, was discussed in [10] . The implementation is mainly in Ada, and based on annexes D and E of the Ada Reference Manual resp. of realtime and distributed systems. Annex E (abbreviated DSA) provides support for efficient distribution by making the middleware layer completely transparent and the development easier. The distribution in the application is managed by the middleware PolyORB [46] (maintained by AdaCore).
The covered control scenarios and interoperability aspects in [10] are very close to those presented and discussed in this article. The Ada application is a proof of concept of our formal design, and we expect to contemplate prototyping real drones in the future. The development process will be much easier to approach. The predictive analysis presented in the next two sections has pre-chewed a lot of the work.
Concerning wireless connectivity in UAVs, an in-depth analysis of the implementation opportunities and challenges is provided in [47] . According to the authors, low-altitude short-range line-of-sight communication scheme seems to be the best suited to our case study, and may potentially lead to significant performance gains. This modality of wireless connectivity allows the dynamic adjustment of the UAV states to well suit the networking environment. For example, when a UAV experiences good channels with ground terminals, it can conserve energy to sustain good wireless connectivity in order to transmit more data to terminals. This is entirely what is needed in our medical rescue context. The standards IEEE 802.11p [48] and ITS-G5 [49] can be adopted to implement Drone-to-Drone or Drone-to-GCS communications since they suit such highly dynamic networking topology.
VI. ANALYSIS OF ENDOGENOUS RESILIENCE
We distinguish four features to handle endogenous resilience in our context: 1) the interactive behavior between drones and the GCS during their flights, 2) their behavioral actions (and reactions) while interacting with the GCS, 3) wireless network latency impact on timing predictability, and 4) survivability in the presence of malicious attacks and functional or timeout faults. Design and verification approaches dealing with the second feature, which cover particularly the individual internal behavior of component units, are well established both in academia and industry.
In this section, we provide a formal methodology to reason about (by abstract prediction) and verify together the first, the third, and the fourth features since they are challenging and lack of a deep investigation in the literature. We reflect in our formal design under UPPAAL the relevant parts of the components behavior, which are related to their synchronous interoperability in the presence of middleware and network abstract models. Asynchronous data exchange is restricted to non-critical communications and hardware management (see Subsection V-B) and not considered in our design.
1 https://github.com/mouelhis/adawrplatoon First, we start by recalling the definition of timed automata and their transitional semantics. Second, we present UPPAAL design patterns of the interactive behavior of the software and middleware components under an abstract network model. These patterns are to avoid hindering the article with the final models, and to make them easy to approach. Then, we provide an ample formal body on the expression of fairness conditions in CTL, and how timed automata in UPPAAL could be constrained to meet fairness, and ensure starvation-free behaviors and liveness. We end the section with the CTL properties, that we extract from BCL generic contracts of the UPPAAL design patterns, and use for verification.
A. NETWORKS OF TIMED AUTOMATA
No better than the UPPAAL tutorial [12] to recall the common definition of timed automata: f ded by synchronous-evolving clocks used to abstract and reason about the real-time behaviors of systems. UPPAAL extends them by bounded discrete integer variables. In this pargaraph, we slightly revisit the succinct and intuitive definitions of the formalism and its semantics given in [12] for more precision.
We denote by X the universal set of discrete variables. Given a set X ⊂ X, we define by T[x] the type (possible values) of x ∈ X , written x : T[x] for short. T X is the type of X (the union set of Cartesian products x i ∈X T[σ (x i )] for all permutations σ : X → X ). We write T X 1 , ..., X n for T 1≤i≤n (X i ) with X i ⊂ X. We denote by C the universal set of clocks. We have T[c] = R + for any c ∈ C, and T[C] = (R + ) n for any C ⊂ C with a cardinality |C| = n. The left shifted (or the next) version of x ∈ X with a one logic step is denoted by x : T[x] e.g., let us consider two logic successive states s 1 and s 2 , if x = x 1 at s 1 and x = x 2 at s 2 , then x = x 2 at s 1 and so on. We generalize the notation for sets, X is the set of next versions x of all x ∈ X .
Conditions are predicates of the First-Order Logic (FOL). Given X = {x 1 , ..., x n } ⊂ X, a predicate p on x ∈ X represents a subset of the possible values of x i.e., p is a sub-type of T [x] . A predicate Q on X is then a sub-type of T X . The projection of Q on Z = {z 1 , ..., z k } ⊆ X is written Q Z . The syntax of predicates, functions, operators and constants are defined according to variable types under specific theories (equality, linear arithmetic, etc). Q x/x is Q by substituting x ∈ X by its primed version x . We generalize the notation for sets:
• a set of locations ϒ with ı ∈ ϒ is the initial state;
• a set of actions ;
For all c ∈ (R + ) n = T C where n = |C|, we denote by c ⊕ τ the tuple (c 1 + τ, . .., c n + τ ). To save space, we write 33748 VOLUME 7, 2019 e 1 ...e k instead of (e 1 , ..., e k ) with k ∈ N + . We write A.K for any component K ∈ {ϒ, ı, , , G, E, J , I} of A. Definition 2: The semantics S(A) of A is a labeled transition system LTS (S, s 0 , R) where S ⊂ ϒ×R |C| ×T X is the set of states with s 0 = (ı, J (ı) C , J (ı) X ) ∈ S is initial, and R ⊆ S×(R + ∪ )→S is a transition function such that:
In UPPAAL's graphical language, a system is modeled by a Network of Timed Automata (NTA) with concurrent behavioral semantics over sets of common clocks and variables C, X ⊂ C, X, and actions split into two disjoint subsets asy and sy of resp. asynchronous and synchronous actions. This NTA is written A 1 ... A n (or A 1..n ), and consists of n TAs A i for i ∈ {1, ..., n}. We write K i ,Ῡ andī resp. for A i .K , the product i ϒ i , and the vector ı 1 ...ı n . We define I ⊆Ῡ → T C, X and J ⊆ {ī} → T C, X resp. such that
From a given state of the resulted LTS, every A i may 1) fire a transition separately by elapsing time, or by enabling an asynchronous action and applying its individual update on variables and clocks, or 2) synchronize with another TA A j through transition(s) labeled by a synchronous action a enabled as output (depicted a! in UPPAAL) in one of them and as input (depicted by a? in UPPAAL) in the other such that a! transition update applies before that of a? transition.
The toolbox UPPAAL offers additional design features like time urgency, synchronous and broadcasting (asynchronous) channels, data types (arrays and structures), etc. It has a query language to specify CTL properties for model-checking; their taxonomy is introduced in Subsection VI-C. 
B. UPPAAL DESIGN PATTERNS
To preserve space and hide complexity, instead of presenting the whole UPPAAL models of our CPS case study, we present our experience as generic design patterns, reusable in other contexts with adaptations. The models of the jobs Flight and Control, resp. of GCS and Drone, are discussed in reference to those patterns (see Subsection VI-D). As stated in Section I, we mainly use UPPAAL to sustain our predictive analysis approach while being aware that the verification of an exhaustive design will not scale due to the state explosion problem. Nevertheless, the provided models are verifiable in an acceptable time (see Subsection VI-D).
We consider a wireless channel with a frequency band divided into a fixed number NBT of half-duplex tracks (subfrequencies). The exchanged messages are defined as an array message[NBT] of data frames. It contains among others the coded message, and the identities of the transmitter and the receiver. It is updated when a message is posted through the channel Input[track], or when a message is received from the channel Output[track] (see patterns 3 and 4).
Pattern 1 (Network track):
A network frequency track (see Fig. 10 ) can be designed as a timed automaton where a trace starts by an input action on the channel Input[track] if data are posted through the corresponding track, and finishes by an output action from the broadcast channel Output[track] to provide the frame message[track] to the destination(s). The network latency is measured by a clock h local to each track and bounded by MAX_LATENCY. It is reset to 0 by firing each input/output synchronization edge or if no traffic is present on the track for a delay equal to MAX_IDLE.
Broadcast channels allow one-to-many synchronizations: an edge with an output action a! on a broadcast channel a can always fire (if the guard is satisfied), no matter if any receiving edges (labeled by a?) are enabled immediately or not. Those receiving edges once enabled will synchronize [12] . Pattern 2 (Hacker): A hacker can be designed as a single state self-loop automaton injecting faults in message[track], transiting on track (see Fig. 9 ). The hack is assumed to VOLUME 7, 2019 intervene during the transmission phase (in the location Latency) by enabling the input event Hack[track]?.
The above patterns may seem very simplistic since wireless networking and hacking malicious attacks cannot be resumed by these light abstractions. Instead of investigating concrete hacking scenarios, our goal here is to predict not only the system survivability if such attack is detected, but also its reaction when latency exceeds the prefixed timing bound for synchronous communications. References to some research studies on networking analysis and attack resilience in CPSs are discussed in the related works (see Section II). 
Pattern 3 (Middleware Tx):
The middleware transmitter Tx (see Fig. 11 , top) is defined separately for each subsystem node. It is designed as a wing-automaton looping on the initial state for each software action Soft_Action_i[unit_j] (method calls, return values or exceptions) made by a component unit_j (method and jobs bodies). The middle urgent location Access is used for network channel_access(). If a track is available, access will be given to post() the coded message atomically via the commited (see the explanation below) location Post, while synchronizing with the network on Input [track] .
An urgent location is equivalent to a location such that its incoming edges reset a clock c, and it is labeled with an invariant c ≤ 0. Time does not progress in urgent locations. However, interleaving with other clock-free edges is allowed. A committed location is more restrictive: its outgoing edges can be only interleaved with those of the other committed locations [12] . In the Tx pattern (see Fig. 11, top) , Access is urgent since interleaving is allowed only when no tracks are available. The location Post is however commited because when access is given, Tx is intended to post immediately.
Pattern 4 (Middleware Rx):
The middleware receiver Rx (see Fig. 11, bottom) 
Pattern 7 (Periodic job):
A periodic job can be designed in UPPAAL as an automaton complying to the pattern showed in Fig. 12 . The parameter job is used to instantiate several times the body for interactions if needed. After initialization, job takes a Decision at the beginning of each periodic life cycle until reaching -if possible -a desired goal behavior. Three main causes can prevent it to reach that goal: the detection of an intrusion, reaching the maximum number of authorized timeouts (timeout_count is decremented until reaching 0), or being aware of a critical_error. In this case, the retrograded operation mode is activated if the situation is deemed critical. Otherwise, job executes its nominal body by calling local or remote methods, and performing local computations resulted from their return and exception events. In Fig. 12 , we show the simple interactive scenario of calling a remote Method, if a Return value is received, job exploits it to check whether the goal behavior is reached or not. By catching Exception, job -according to its impact on the system operation -decides if critical_error should be set or not. If an Attack is detected, intrusion is set to true. If MAX_WAIT is elapsed and nothing is received, the job synchronizes on the channel Timeout and decretments timeout_count.
In order to reach timeout scenarios in the job traces during model-checking, a TIMEOUT_WINDOW extra delay is added to the invariant of location Wait. During this delay Rx and job may synchronize on Timeout (see Subsection VI-E). The global variables from_middleware [call] and to_middleware [call] are used to force the output (resp. input) actions of job to synchronize with the transmitter Tx (resp. the receiver Rx) corresponding actions, instead of synchronizing directly with the method bodies as depicted in Fig. 11 . 
Pattern 8 (Remote method):
A remote method (see Fig. 13 Methods are considered to be stateless one-shot programs, and are invoked if needed by their environments. No infinite loop behaviors are expected by running a method, and consequently possible traces of its behavior should be constrained by the presence of a final (implicit) state equal to the initial one. This choice was made to guarantee that an instance of the method body could be instantiated (called) for a limited number of times: we cannot expect unlimited method calls in formal design, which may be the case in real executions.
C. FAIRNESS CONDITIONS
The query language of UPPAAL utilizes a subset of CTL to define properties. It consists of state and trace formulae. State formulae describe individual states, whereas trace formulae quantify over traces of the model semantics (see definitions 2 and 3). Trace formulae are classified into safety, reachability and liveness. Safety properties state that ''something bad will never happen''. These properties are usually formulated positively, something good is invariantly true, i.e., given φ a state formula φ, A φ expresses that φ should be true in all states. Reachability states that ''something expected to happen will occur under some circumstances'', i.e., there is a trace starting from the initial state, such that φ eventually holds (denoted E♦φ). Liveness states that ''something good will eventually happen''. Liveness could be simply expressed by the formula A♦φ. A more useful form is the leads to property φ ψ: whenever φ is satisfied, then eventually the state formula ψ will be satisfied [12] .
Since we are only interested in the correctness of execution starvation-free fair traces when verifying distributed systems. A system model in UPPAAL is usually reduced to a collection of deadlock-free processes (specified in a NTA), and we need to consider only those traces in which each process resumes infinitely often. Unfair traces, in which one process always executes while preventing the others to resume (starvation), are ignored. Since only finite state semantics are considered, fairness requires that some of their states are visited infinitely often in every fair computation (especially states that should be reached to satisfy liveness properties) [15] .
By default, the fairness conditions cannot be expressed in CTL i.e., CTL cannot express that some proposition should eventually hold on all fair traces [14] . A common solution to this problem is to modify the CTL semantics. Traditionally, the semantics of CTL formulae is defined with respect to a labeled state-transition graph M = (S, R, P) consisting of: a finite set of states S, a transition relation R ⊆ S × S, and an assignment P : S → 2 AP of atomic propositions in AP to states. To express fairness, the semantics M is extended by F ⊆ 2 S . A trace of M is fair iff for each state set F ∈ F, there are infinitely many positions on it at which some state of F appears. The new semantics is the same as that of CTL except that trace quantifiers range over only fair traces [15] .
Exercising model-checking in UPPAAL led us to reason about fairness to guarantee liveness properties. Given that the query language of UPPAAL does not support fair semantics, we need to intervene at the level of the model by acting on TAs transitions activation. We first present an extension of CTL syntax to express fairness conditions. It is actually a subset of CTL * [18] . Then, practical examples are given to show how to constrain UPPAAL models to meet fairness.
CTL EXTENSION
The semantics S(A 1..n ) of NTA (Definition 3) and S(A) of single timed automata (Definition 2) are equivalent except the presence of composite statesl ∈Ῡ in the first. Otherwise we have always time or channel transitions in both of them. Thence, we found the following notations on Definition 2 by assuming A to be an NTA. A trace σ derived from R is an infinite sequence s 0 
A transition of sa → t ∈ R covered by σ is written s[a]t : σ . We write s : σ when the state s is traversed by σ . We consider infinite traces since S(A) is assumed to be deadlock-free. The traces of S(A) combine together in an infinite labeled transition tree T(S(A)) obtained by unfolding S(A) from the initial state s 0 . We denote by σ s any trace of T(S(A)) starting from a state s in T(S(A)) reachable from s 0 . We denote byṡ ∈ S the image of s in S(A). We define by vi ∞ σ an infinite sequence of monotonic natural indexes k 1 ..k l . . . of states traversed by σ such that the difference between any two successive indexes of the sequence is variable i.e., for all k i k i+1 , k j k j+1 where i =j, k i+1 − k i might be equal or different from k j+1 − k j . We write k : vi semantics of CTL are given in [14] and [15] ); | means ''satisfy''. Trace formulae
Note that the first five state formulae are already defined in CTL [14] , [15] . We introduce the last four formulae; they could be read by the following statements:
φ is infinitely often satisfied by an infinity of the states traversed by σ (may be not all of them) i.e., φ is said here to be unconditionally fair [50] ;
for all traces σ s of M starting from s, φ is eventually always satisfied from a state r posterior to s in σ s ;
• M, s | E ♦φ: ♦φ holds only for some traces σ s ; • M, s | E♦ φ: ♦ φ holds only for some traces σ s .
STRONG, WEAK AND EVENTUAL FAIRNESS CONDITIONS
In order to express fairness conditions using the previous state formulae, we need to introduce the facts of enabling and firing actions in M as state formulae, Let a ∈ R + ∪ , the formula Enabled(a) is a state predicate asserting that a is enabled.
Definition 4: M is strongly fair for an action a iff there is no trace σ in M in which a is infinitely often enabled by S(A) but never infinitely often fired in σ . This statement is written formally M | SF(a) where SF(a) is defined as follows.
Definition 5: M is weakly fair for an action a iff there is no trace σ in M in which a is always enabled by S(A) but never infinitely often fired in σ . This statement is written formally M | WF(a) where WF(a) is defined as follows.
We also consider the case where the action a is eventually enabled but never fired, hence we introduce a new condition called eventual fairness. Definition 6: M is eventually fair for an action a iff there is no trace σ in M in which a is enabled occasionally by S(A) but never fired in σ . This statement is written formally M | EF(a) where EF(a) is defined as follows.
EF(a) A(♦Enabled(a) ⇒ ♦Fired(a))
M is assumed to be unconditionally fair for time actions τ ∈ R + i.e., the axioms (ufe τ ) and (uff τ ) below are assumed to hold in M.
PROVING LIVENESS PROPERTIES UNDER FAIRNESS CONDITIONS
A liveness formula φ ψ holds under a strongly fair M for an action a ∈ if the rule (sf ) is backward satisfied.
Whenever it is satisfied, φ inevitably leads to traces along which a is certainly infinitely often enabled (premises 2 and 3). Since M is strongly fair for a and firing a inevitably leads to ψ (premise 1), then φ ψ holds.
The formula φ ψ holds under a weakly fair M for an action a ∈ if the rule (wf ) is backward satisfied.
Whenever φ is satisfied, then the action a is enabled, which means that in the traces where a is eventually always enabled, φ holds permanently from the states at which a is enabled for the first time along these traces (premises 2 and 3) i.e., in the second premise of Rule (sf ) becomes ⇒. Since M is weakly fair for a and firing a inevitably leads to ψ (premise 1), then φ ψ holds. The formula φ ψ holds under an eventually fair M for an action a ∈ if the rule (ef ) is backward satisfied.
If the action a is eventually enabled in some fragments of all the traces (premise 3), then φ when satisfied will lead inevitably to those fragments (premise 2). Since a is also fired from those fragments and inevitably leads to ψ (premise 1), then φ ψ holds.
We can also define rules for liveness formulae of the form A♦φ. The rule (sf A♦ ) states that A♦φ holds under a strongly fair M for an action a ∈ if a is infinitely often enabled in all the traces (premise 2). Since firing a inevitably leads to φ (premise 1), then A♦φ holds.
The rule (wf A♦ ) states that a formula A♦φ holds under a weakly fair M for an action a ∈ if a is eventually always enabled in all the traces (premise 1). Since firing a inevitably leads to φ (premise 2), then A♦φ holds.
The rule (ef A♦ ) states that a formula A♦φ holds under a eventually fair M for an action a ∈ if a is eventually enabled in all traces over finite fragments (premise 1). Since a will be inevitably fired from those fragments and leads to φ (premise 2), then A♦φ holds.
We would like to mention that our method to define these rules were mainly inspired from [50] and the studies about fairness conditions in the Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA), the logic behind the TLA + language [17] , [51] .
EXPRESSING FAIRNESS IN UPPAAL MODELS
After this theoretical body, we show now how the previous fairness conditions could be expressed in UPPAAL models. If the pattern periodic job of Fig. 14 (top) is instantiated in more then one process without the guard a[job] <= B of go_back, a starvation problem occurs by infinitely running Out loop body of job while preventing the others to resume. Therefore, A♦φ and φ ψ where φ and ψ are state predicates of being resp. in the locations Init and Delay cannot be satisfied for all the processes. To bypass this problem, we should constrain the model by an eventual fairness condition EF(exit) on the action exit. We use for that an integer array a (for active). Init cannot be reached if a[job] exceed a bound B after firing repeatedly go_back. At some point, exit is fired and a is reset to 0 by some process. Consequently, execution is alternated fairly between all processes. If Init is reached from Delay infinitely often for reinitialization reasons (A ♦ reinit holds), then exit is infinitely often enabled and fired, and the periodic job is constrained implicitly by the strong fairness condition SF(exit) (see Fig. 14, bottom) . If the pattern loop behavior of Fig. 15 is instantiated in more then one process without the guard a[job] <= B on the loop, a starvation problem occurs by reaching the state Well in a given process, and firing always the action loop. In this case, the model should be constrained by weak fairness WF(loop) on the action loop. When the bound B is reached, the current process is leaved and a is reset to 0 by another process. The update reset_except_for(job,a) prevents resetting a[job] by the current process job each time loop is fired.
Finally, we impart that UPPAAL ensures timed locations (with clock invariants) to be fairly visited. This induces unconditionally fair timed transitions in the resulted trace tree, which is compliant with axioms (ufe τ ) and (uff τ ). Fairness conditions are only used to constrain the activation of channel actions from untimed locations.
D. CASE STUDY: DESIGN PROCESS AND MEASURES
The UPPAAL models of the periodic jobs Control and Flight resp. of GCS and Drone, are available for download. 2 The models are not exhaustive but sufficiently representative to put into practice the previous design patterns, and to verify endogenous contracts. Our design was divided to two submodels Drone_Flight.xml and GCS_Control.xml and constrained by urgent and commited locations (when possible) in order to reduce the state space, prevent false counterexamples, and speedup model-checking.
We consider a model with two drones and one GCS. The GCS model is multi-task and multi-call: the job Control is instantiated twice one per connected drone; several method calls can be made simultaneously by drones in the node GCS. However, the drone model is mono-task and mono-call: the job Flight is instantiated once in a drone node, and a method cannot be invoked simultaneously several times since only the GCS calls methods from drones, and calls are synchronous. The network communication band is composed of three halfduplex tracks: messages cannot transit simultaneously on a track regardless of their directions (GCS to Drone or Drone to GCS). The middleware Rx receives data from each subsystem in a circular FIFO buffer.
Using these models, we analyzed by prediction the safety behavioral requirements of the GCS and drones when remote communication timeouts, malicious attacks, and functional errors occur. The properties were defined according to the verification process detailed in Subsection VI-E. The model's properties took 45 mn to be verified. The model-checking were performed using the 64 bits version 4.1.19 of UPPAAL running on a Core i7-4710MQ machine at 2.5 GHz.
E. VERIFICATION PROCESS
We opted for a verification-by-contract process making use of the text-based BCL language [41] to define the endogenous resilience contracts. A BCL contract C (A :ā | G :ḡ) is an assume/guarantee statement whereā is a vector of assumptions andḡ is a vector of the guarantees. Assumptions constrains whether a specification meets the guarantees. The BCL rationals should be as simple as possible to reason about requirements and their dependencies. They are very useful to decompose, make easier hard verification processes, and to exhaustively define the formal properties.
For sake of genericity, we present BCL contracts and CTL properties as patterns like in Subsection VI-B. We start by a first contract on the worst-case call blocking time (WCBT) allowed for remote method invocations.
WCBT
(A : awn | G : mcr) Contract WCBT stipulates that the guarantee on the remote call responsiveness (mcr) is relative to the availability and reliability of the wireless network (assumption awn). Since awn cannot be specified in UPPAAL, it is assumed to be always true. According to Pattern 7 and Fig. 12 , this contract can be specified for a periodic job by the following three CTL formulae (typewritten in the query language of UPPAAL): Fig. 5 ). Contract WCET is about the worst-case execution time of periodic jobs. It stipulates that timing predictability (guarantee et) of periodic executions relies on the reliability of the embedded platform and components (battery, sensors and actuators, etc) of the drone (assumption hao) and the guarantee of Contract WCBT (assumption wcbt). Since hao cannot be specified, it is assumed to be always true. Pattern 7 (Fig. 12) Contract Endogenous stipulates that whatever a malicious attack, a critical error, or recurrent timeouts happen, then the retrograde mode is activated (resp. defined by the guarantees atr, cer and ttr). This contract can be specified for Pattern 7 (Fig. 12) The first three properties should be checked to ensure that there is some traces where intrusion, critical_error, and timeout_count == 0 hold eventually so as Endogenous is guaranteed to be checked on real traces. If only some of them hold, the liveness property Endogenous may hold with no trace to check for the others which is not representative.
Jobs Flight and Control resp. of the components Drone and GCS were checked to be deadlock-free (A[] not deadlock), and safe according to the verification process herein. The GCS model was verified with respect to eventual and weak fairness constraints (see Subsection VI-C).
VII. ANALYSIS OF EXOGENOUS RESILIENCE
Exogenous resilience is relative to the drone's presence and operation in its ambient urban environment. Concretely, it should be checked by simulation or by target tests on the signals acquired from sensors and/or applied on actuators. In order to analyze the exogenous resilience in offline, we need ideally a virtualization of the drone in the urban environment to have a better understanding of safety issues, and rigorously reason about them. A 3D model of an imaginary city was constructed for that purpose using the toolbox Blender.
This model describes a navigation scenario as depicted in Section III and Fig. 1 . A scenario is an ordered sequence of frames, the Blender's fundamental time unit, that can reach fractions of a second depending on the frame rate. Since it is practically impossible to meticulously define the animations frame per frame, interpolation is applied to solve this issue. Blender allows the definition of pertinent positions or keys (3D coordinates) for objects at specific frames along which it creates the 3D animation using interpolation algorithms. Three different interpolations are possible: constant, linear and Bézier. We use the Bézier interpolation since it produces smooth and more realistic animations. As stated in Subsection V-C, GCS has the role to control drone missions remotely, and to performs all heavy computations likely to consume energy, vital for flights. Since it has a better awareness of the urban environment, GCS performs the important operation of path planning. By considering the current position of the drone, the destination and the urban cartography, GCS computes by iterative correction the path that the drone needs to follow until the destination. Fig. 16 illustrates the planning process on a sub-path between two positions. After finding the next position p 2 to be reached, GCS acts first lazily and considers the simplest path p 1 p 2 (Fig. 16, left) . Next, it discovers (by anticipated verification) that p 1 p 2 intersects with a building (only permanent obstacles are considered). Finally, it recomputes the path by adding an intermediate position p 3 above the building (Fig. 16, right) . Contract Exogenous states that a flight path is collisionfree (guarantee cf), and the altitude coordinates of the path positions are always bounded by a maximum altitude MA fixed in meters (guarantee da). We assume that obstacles are restricted to buildings, and GCS is aware of their positions and dimensions (assumptions ok and oaw). The Blender builtin plugin CAT is used to specify and verify the LTL properties of the iterative path planning process. We use LTL since the 3D animations on which the properties are checked are one-line frame sequences.
The above contract can be simply translated to the following LTL property pattern:
wherep is the path, and B is the set of building obstacles B i defined in the 3D city model as parallelepiped objects. Video animations of lazy and corrected flight paths are available under the following links along with CAT windows to show whether the LTL properties are met or not:
• lazy planning: https://youtu.be/MdaZhvlz_l8; • corrected planning: https://youtu.be/5cW6PBzoIj8.
VIII. CONCLUSION DISCUSSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
We are currently facing a growth in systems complexity, with increasingly advanced technologies. CPSs, as part of Industry 4.0, are subject to this technological evolution. Embedded computers in CPSs perform complex tasks to control sophisticated physical processes in environments, that are becoming more and more ambient, open and hazardous. In addition, CPSs are required to be resilient to errors and disturbances, and able to recover with the minimum costs. Modeling such systems is difficult especially in critical contexts with regards to their hardware, software and networking architectures, and event unpredictability of their environments.
The contributions of this article suit this context. They are articulated around a predictive approach to analyze resilience in an urban drone rescue system with ground remote control. It is based on a distributed object-oriented component-based software architecture. The structure of an object-oriented component, from our viewpoint, is new compared to the CCM specifications [42] (resembling most to ours) and other definitions [52] , in which periodic jobs, data listeners, and references to component instances are implicit features. We dealt with endogenous and exogenous resilience aspects of the case study at both design and verification. Endogenous resilience is reflected in the system capability of processing internal functional and timing faults, and resisting against cyberattacks. Exogenous resilience relies on the system's ability to safely operate in its ambient environment.
To this effect, we have defined a formal methodology to predict the system's behavior by abstraction, and to verify its resilience properties. We used UPPAAL networks of timed automata to model the distributed interoperability between subsystems, and to analyze its endogenous resilience under an abstract networking model. In order to show the UPPAAL modeling approach in an elegant way, and to avoid hindering the body of the article with the final big models, we opted for the presentation of generic design patterns for the main software and middleware units of the system's component architecture (see Fig. 7 ). Model-checking in UPPAAL led us to also reason about fairness conditions to validate liveness properties. Under this particular scope, we have considered a subset of the CTL * [18] syntax as an extension of CTL to express strong, weak, and eventual fairness. Strong and weak fairness conditions were well studied for different kinds of temporal logics [17] , [18] , [50] . The novelty in this article includes the introduction of the eventual fairness condition, the rules to prove liveness properties, and the style by which the formal material was presented.
Our design was mainly shaped to properly tackle a key problem of CPSs which comes down to this question: how to explicitly analyze the endogenous interactive behavior of the system parts early during the design phase to ensure high integrity in safety-critical scenarios? By focusing on this key issue, we are solving one of the major problems of classic reactive approaches widely adopted in critical systems industry, which to our knowledge still has no complete and rigorous tooled solutions (see Section I).
Regarding the choice of UPPAAL, we claim that this tool is the best suited to our time constrained predictive analysis of CPSs endogenous resilience for the following reasons: 1) its specification language, based on TAs, is GUIpowered and adequate to design time-aware models; 2) it supports a subset of the C language to specify state transition updates on clocks and discrete variables, and to prechew implementation; 3) its query language used to define properties is based on CTL, which is a branching time logic quantifying over computation trees rather than individual traces; 4) it also provides a GUI for simulation and counterexample analysis; 5) it supports statistical model-checking (UPPAAL-SCM) [53] .
Other free toolboxes comparable to UPPAAL are available. To the best of our knowledge, none of them combine all the above features. In this paragraph, we quote two tools that we think are the closest to UPPAAL. The first tool is PAT (Pattern Analysis Toolkit) 3 : an enhanced model-checker for real-time and concurrent systems. Model-checking under PAT is based on LTL, which is less expressive than CTL. Counterexamples can be graphically visualized, but unfolded in long traces if the model is complex. Under UPPAAL, counterexamples simulation is more user-friendly since traces can be animated directly on TAs. The second is TAPAAL 4 : an effi-cient model-checker of timed-arc Petri nets. Like UPPAAL, it offers a GUI for design, simulation, and CTL-based modelchecking. However, besides the fact that design using timedarc Petri nets is less intuitive compared to TAs, TAPPAL has no background language to specify transition behaviors over discrete variables, which is useful for implementation purposes.
Powerful commercial proof tools are also available for industrial safety-critical applications: Prover Certifier (Prover Technology AB), Frama-C (CEA), Modeling Rules Verifier and Optimizer (SafeRiver), Systerel Smart Solver (Systerel), etc. These tools make use of inductive proof engines based on efficient symbolic SAT/SMT solvers: Math-SAT, 5 CVC4, 6 Glucose, 7 Lingeling, 8 etc. This work could be extended by introducing a complete formal design and verification framework for resilience analysis based on the above solvers.
Our predictive formal analysis of exogenous resilience is embodied within a virtual modern city 3D (Blender) model. To meet the exogenous contracts, flight paths are synthesized by repetitive LTL model-checking using the CAT tool (a Blender plugin). The goal behind this virtualization is that the GCS follows a similar approach when computing flight paths for drones on real city 3D maps. We deliberately did not give more materials about this part in Section VII because what was left is restricted to useless implementation details. Unfortunately, we are not able to share the source code of the CAT plugin and the Blender 3D models due to the intellectual property clauses promulgated by CEA.
We see three main directions for future works. The first is to introduce a top-down component-based theory of our approach. One possible trail is to revisit and question the theory of timed I/O automata in [54] , particularly the ''inputenabled'' hypothesis (all input actions are enabled from any location in an I/O timed automaton). This assumption is contradictory with our approach and quite inconsistent, from our perspective, with object-oriented design. The second is to compare, with statistical model-checking, existing network protocols and UAV fleet models using UPPAAL-SCM, using our predictive analysis approach. The third is prototyping real drones based on the software architecture of Fig. 7 and the implementation approach discussed in [10] . 
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